Papers

Feng, Yiding, Jason D. Hartline, and Yingkai Li. “Simple mechanisms for non-linear agents.” In Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 3802-3816. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2023.

Dong, Jinshuo, Jason Hartline, and Aravindan Vijayaraghavan. “Classification Protocols with Minimal Disclosure.” In Proceedings of the 2022 Symposium on Computer Science and Law, pp. 67-76. 2022.

Hartline, Jason D., Daniel W. Linna Jr, Liren Shan, and Alex Tang. “Algorithmic Learning Foundations for Common Law.” In Proceedings of the 2022 Symposium on Computer Science and Law, pp. 109-117. 2022.

Hartline, Jason D., Yingkai Li, Liren Shan, and Yifan Wu. “Optimization of scoring rules.” arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.02905 (2020).

Feng, Yiding, Ronen Gradwohl, Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, and Denis Nekipelov. “Bias-variance games.” In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 328-329. 2022.

Zhang, Chenhao, Jason D. Hartline, and Christos Dimoulas. “Karp: a language for NP reductions.” In Proceedings of the 43rd ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, pp. 762-776. 2022.

Niazadeh, Rad, Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, and Brendan Lucier. “Fast core pricing for rich advertising auctions.” Operations Research 70, no. 1 (2022): 223-240.

Feng, Yiding, Jason D. Hartline, and Yingkai Li. “Revelation gap for pricing from samples.” In Proceedings of the 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 1438-1451. 2021.

Kayongo, Paula, Glenn Sun, Jason Hartline, and Jessica Hullman. “Visualization equilibrium.” IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics 28, no. 1 (2021): 465-474.

Babaioff, Moshe, Richard Cole, Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, and Brendan Lucier. “Non-quasi-linear Agents in Quasi-linear Mechanisms.” arXiv preprint arXiv:2012.02893 (2020).

Deng, Yuan, Jason Hartline, Jieming Mao, and Balasubramanian Sivan. “Welfare-maximizing Guaranteed Dashboard Mechanisms.” Available at SSRN 3858104 (2021).

Haghpanah, Nima, and Jason Hartline. “When is pure bundling optimal?.” The Review of Economic Studies 88, no. 3 (2021): 1127-1156.

Dughmi, Shaddin, Jason Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg, and Rad Niazadeh. “Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design.” Journal of the ACM (JACM) 68, no. 2 (2021): 1-30.

Hartline, Jason, Aleck Johnsen, and Yingkai Li. “Benchmark design and prior-independent optimization.” In 2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 294-305. IEEE, 2020.

Babaioff, Moshe, Richard Cole, Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, and Brendan Lucier. “Non-quasi-linear Agents in Quasi-linear Mechanisms.” arXiv preprint arXiv:2012.02893 (2020).

Feng, Yiding, Jason D. Hartline, and Yingkai Li. “Simple mechanisms for non-linear agents.” In Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 3802-3816. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2023.

Abebe, Rediet, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, and Jason D. Hartline. “A truthful cardinal mechanism for one-sided matching.” In Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, pp. 2096-2113. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2020.

Hartline, Jason, Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, and Zihe Wang. “Inference from auction prices.” In Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 2472-2491. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2020.

Hartline, Jason D., Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, and Onno Zoeter. “Dashboard mechanisms for online marketplaces.” In Proceedings of the 2019 acm conference on economics and computation, pp. 591-592. 2019.

Feng, Yiding, Jason D. Hartline, and Yingkai Li. “Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing: Beyond linear utility.” In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 885-886. 2019.

Hartline, Jason, and Samuel Taggart. “Sample complexity for non-truthful mechanisms.” In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 399-416. 2019.

Feng, Yiding, and Jason D. Hartline. “An end-to-end argument in mechanism design (prior-independent auctions for budgeted agents).” In 2018 IEEE 59th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 404-415. IEEE, 2018.

Alaei, Saeed, Jason Hartline, Rad Niazadeh, Emmanouil Pountourakis, and Yang Yuan. “Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing.” Games and Economic Behavior 118 (2019): 494-510.

Chawla, Shuchi, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov, and Anant Shah. “Mechanism redesign.” arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.04699 (2017).

Hartline, Jason, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier, and Rad Niazadeh. “Fast core pricing for rich advertising auctions.” In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 111-112. 2018.

Balkanski, Eric, and Jason D. Hartline. “Bayesian budget feasibility with posted pricing.” In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on World Wide Web, pp. 189-203. 2016.

Chawla, Shuchi, Jason Hartline, and Denis Nekipelov. “A/B testing of auctions.” In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 19-20. 2016.

Hartline, Jason, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Eva Tardos. “No-regret learning in Bayesian games.” Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 28 (2015).

Hartline, Jason D., and Brendan Lucier. “Non-optimal mechanism design.” American Economic Review 105, no. 10 (2015): 3102-3124.

Hartline, Jason D., Robert Kleinberg, and Azarakhsh Malekian. “Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings.” Games and Economic Behavior 92 (2015): 401-429.

Devanur, Nikhil R., Jason D. Hartline, and Qiqi Yan. “Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design.” Journal of Economic Theory 156 (2015): 103-143.

Chawla, Shuchi, Jason D. Hartline, and Balasubramanian Sivan. “Optimal crowdsourcing contests.” Games and Economic Behavior 113 (2019): 80-96.

Haghpanah, Nima, and Jason Hartline. “Multi-dimensional virtual values and second-degree price discrimination.” arXiv preprint arXiv:1404.1341 (2014).

Chawla, Shuchi, Jason Hartline, and Denis Nekipelov. “Mechanism design for data science.” In Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation, pp. 711-712. 2014.

Hartline, Jason, Darrell Hoy, and Sam Taggart. “Price of anarchy for auction revenue.” In Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation, pp. 693-710. 2014.

Fu, Hu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline, and Robert Kleinberg. “Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling.” In Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation, pp. 23-36. 2014.

Alaei, Saeed, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, and Jason Hartline. “The simple economics of approximately optimal auctions.” In 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 628-637. IEEE, 2013.

Hartline, Jason D. “Bayesian mechanism design.” Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science 8, no. 3 (2013): 143-263.

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